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THE PSYCHOLOGY OF AGGREGATION:
PROMISE AND POTENTIAL PITFALLS
Tom R. Tyler*
The contributions of Judge Weinstein defy simple categorization.
He has literally shaped the entire face of the law during his years on
the bench.1  Recognizing the futility of trying to encompass this enor-
mous corpus of work, I want to focus on one area in which Judge
Weinstein is widely recognized for having had an important and inno-
vative role: aggregate litigation.  His handling of the Agent Orange
case2 is probably his best known case in this area, but he also managed
a variety of other similar cases.  And, I will draw on the area in which
I can make the most useful contribution by focusing on the psychology
of aggregation.
I begin with the premise that it is important for the courts to have
popular legitimacy.  We want the public to trust the courts and see
them as a mechanism of recourse when the public has grievances.  We
want that because the courts can play an important positive role in
building trust and confidence in law and government, and provide
support for democratic authorities.3
* Tom R. Tyler is the Macklin Fleming Professor of Law and Professor of Psychology at Yale
University.  His research explores the dynamics of authority in groups, organizations, and socie-
ties.  In particular, he examines the role of judgments about the justice or injustice of group
procedures in shaping legitimacy, compliance and cooperation.  He is the author of several
books, including The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice (1988); Social Justice in a Diverse
Society (1997); Cooperation in Groups (2000); Trust in the Law (2002); Why People Obey the
Law (2006); and Why People Cooperate (2011).  He received his Ph.D. in social psychology from
UCLA in 1978.  Since then he has taught at Northwestern University, the University of Califor-
nia at Berkeley, and New York University.  This paper was delivered at the Clifford Symposium
on April 24–25, 2014 at DePaul University College of Law.
1. See generally JEFFREY B. MORRIS, LEADERSHIP ON THE FEDERAL BENCH: THE CRAFT AND
ACTIVISM OF JACK WEINSTEIN (2011).
2. See generally PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS TOXIC DISASTERS IN
THE COURTS 111–252 (1987).
3. See Tracey L. Meares & Tom R. Tyler, Essay, Justice Sotomayor and the Jurisprudence of
Procedural Justice, 123 YALE L.J. F. 525, 528 (2014), available at http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/
justice-sotomayor-and-the-jurisprudence-of-procedural-justice.
711
712 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:711
Conversely, when people lack conventional routes within which to
bring their grievances before authorities, they are more likely to take
their actions outside the boundaries of the law.4
From the perspective of public trust, there are reasons to be con-
cerned about the courts.  A 2012 national survey found that 56% of
Americans indicated they trust their local courts.5  And a 2013 study
showed that 68% of African Americans felt that the courts treated
them less fairly than whites.6  This level of trust has been stable for the
last thirty years.
This leads to three comments about the relationship of aggregate
litigation to legitimacy.  First, aggregation is desirable because it al-
lows more people access to bring their grievances into the legal system
and as a consequence to feel fairly treated through the provision of
voice.  Second, it is not enough to allow cases to be brought into the
system. From a legitimacy perspective, it is also important how they
are handled.  Here, the issue is one of the most useful roles for the
judge to play in structuring the management of aggregation.  Finally, I
argue for the benefits and potential risks of using self-aggregation as a
mechanism for managing mass injuries in an era in which the avenue
of judge-based aggregate litigation within the courts is being
diminished.
I. THE LEGITIMACY OF THE COURTS
Justice Breyer has recently argued that the courts are central to cre-
ating a context in which communities can “respond to a universal need
present in every society . . . for some method for resolving disputes
among individuals.”7  Further, Justice Breyer recognizes the impor-
tance of Supreme Court legitimacy, suggesting that “public acceptance
is not automatic and cannot be taken for granted. The Court itself
must help maintain the public’s trust in the Court, the public’s confi-
4. Cf. Katrin Hohl et al., The Effect of the 2011 London Disorder on Public Opinion of Police
and Attitudes Towards Crime, Disorder, and Sentencing, 7 POLICING: J. POL’Y & PRAC. 12, 19–20
(2013). See generally Jonathan Jackson, Aziz Z. Huq, Ben Bradford & Tom R. Tyler, Mono-
polizing Force? Police Legitimacy and Public Attitudes Toward the Acceptability of Violence, 19
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 479 (2013); Tom R. Tyler & Jonathan Jackson, Popular Legitimacy
and the Exercise of Legal Authority: Motivating Compliance, Cooperation, and Engagement, 20
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 78 (2014).
5. Tom R. Tyler & Justin Sevier, How Do the Courts Create Popular Legitimacy?: The Role of
Establishing the Truth, Punishing Justly, and/or Acting Through Just Procedures, 77 ALB. L.
REV. 1095, 1137 fig. 2 (2014).
6. Social & Demographic Trends, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Aug. 22, 2013).  http://www.pewsocial
trends.org/2013/08/22/chapter-1-i-have-a-dream-50-years-later/#treatment-of-blacks-by-the-
courts-police-seen-as-less-fair.
7. STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 138 (2010).
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dence in the Constitution, and the public’s commitment to the rule of
law.”8  And he notes the need to motivate political participation as a
way of maintaining a viable democracy.9  Justice Breyer’s argument
suggests the importance of creating avenues within the legal system
for people to pursue their grievances—avenues that lead people to
feel that they have received a just hearing.
Justice Breyer does not examine the question of how the Court can
facilitate the goal of maintaining legitimacy.  Fortunately, there is an
empirical literature that addresses this question both in terms of the
Supreme Court and of the courts in general.10  That literature pro-
vides a framework within which we can understand how the public
evaluates legitimacy.  The results of that research are very clear: peo-
ple evaluate the courts through a framework of procedural justice.
Their primary concern is whether judges exercise their authority fairly
when managing their cases.
What does procedural justice mean to people involved with the
courts?  Studies of litigants usually identify some concerns linked to
how fairly decisions are made.  Fairness in decision making involves
issues of voice and neutrality.
First, people want voice so that they can participate in decisions
about the resolution of problems or the application of rules concern-
ing situations in which they have a dispute with others.  When dealing
with judicial authorities such as judges, this typically means that peo-
ple want to have an opportunity to explain their situation or tell their
side of the story to that authority before decisions are made and out-
comes determined.  This opportunity to make arguments and present
evidence should occur before the judge makes decisions about what to
do.  People are interested in having a voice.
Second, whether people feel that the procedures were fair is linked
to whether there is evidence that the authorities with whom they have
been dealing were neutral.  This requires an explanation of the pro-
cess through which the court handles a case, and how courts use rules
to make those decisions.  Neutrality involves authorities making deci-
sions based on consistently applied legal principles and the facts of the
case, not personal opinions and biases.  Transparency or openness
about what the rules and procedures are, and how decisions are being
made, involves the appearance of neutrality through following such
rules.
8. Id. at xiii.
9. Id. at xii.
10. For a review of this literature, see Meares & Tyler, supra note 3.
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My comments on aggregate litigation will be framed in terms of the
goal of popular legitimacy for the courts and the government, and will
consider that issue through the lens of procedural justice.  The key
underlying point is that people want to have voice and, having had
that voice, they want to see that decisions are being made through the
neutral and consistent application of legal principles to the facts of the
case, as those facts are revealed by the parties during judicial
proceedings.
II. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LITIGATION
The American litigation system gives considerable control over the
management of grievances to litigants, at least in comparison to many
other systems, such as those found in Germany and France.  Litigants
decide whether to initiate a case, how to investigate and present their
story, and whether to accept settlements or judicial decisions arrived
at in mediation or in a trial.  As Judge Weinstein notes, the tradition is
one of “individual justice and control of their cases by the parties, as
well as devotion to the individual client by attorneys that stamps this
country’s approach to the law.”11
This does not mean that judges are not involved.  They make deci-
sions about whether and in what form cases are presented to the
courts.  They also shape the nature, costs, and speed of ongoing litiga-
tion.  Finally, they make many judicial decisions in nonjury trials and
approve settlements.  Nonetheless, the American legal system is char-
acterized by the comparatively large amount of control over cases that
is retained by the parties to a case.  The assumption is “that each indi-
vidual plaintiff is entitled to control his own case and that each defen-
dant is entitled to defend against individual plaintiffs.”12
Psychological research on litigant satisfaction establishes the impor-
tance of voice and neutrality.  This research suggests that there are
psychological benefits to this legal framework.13  Giving control to the
parties is consistent with the notion that people involved in disputes
want to maintain control over their conflicts and are more satisfied
when they feel that they have control over decisions that involve
them.  People resist giving power to third-party authorities such as
judges, and only do so reluctantly when efforts at negotiation have
11. JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION 1 (1995).
12. Jack B. Weinstein, Preliminary Reflections on Administration of Complex Litigation, 2009
CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 1, 14, available at www.cardozolawreview.com/de-novo-2009.html.
Judge Weinstein characterizes this assumption as having “more force in the era of the horse and
buggy.” Id.
13. Tyler & Jackson, supra note 4, at 90.
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been unsuccessful or they are compelled to do so by law when the
other party seeks to make a legal claim.  In other words, “we are au-
tonomous individuals who want to make our own decisions, direct the
course of our lives, and when necessary, initiate our own litigation—
particularly when it involves something as deeply personal as our
health or safety.”14  When people give up their personal power to judi-
cial authorities, they seek to retain control over the presentation of
their case, as well as of the ability to interrogate other parties, nor-
mally through an attorney, whom they hire and whose actions they
feel they can control.  The adversary system, as traditionally con-
ceived, is well-designed to produce satisfaction with the litigation pro-
cess among both winners and losers, and in so doing, maintains the
legitimacy of the legal system and of judges.
This basic satisfaction with traditional litigation is supported empiri-
cally by the research of Thibaut and Walker, who studied adversarial
and inquisitorial procedures for dispute resolution.15  Their studies
demonstrated first, that people prefer to retain control over disputes;
and second, that when disputes must be given over to third-party au-
thorities, people try to retain control over the presentation of evi-
dence, even when they must give up control over decisions about the
outcome.16  The Thibaut and Walker research focused on a litigant’s
satisfaction with trial outcomes and suggested that the adversarial sys-
tem maximized satisfaction because it maximized litigant control over
evidence presentation and, indirectly, over outcomes.17  This body of
research points to the particular importance of giving people voice,
i.e., control over the gathering and presentation of evidence.  As
noted, the combination of opportunities for voice and neutrality de-
fine fair procedures for decision making.
Does this general framework for understanding people’s evalua-
tions of the courts fit the context of litigants pursuing claims?  The
issue is why people sue in the first place, and when they stop trying to
pursue their grievances.  Early discussions of when people pursue law-
suits emphasized the centrality of calculations of gain and loss in deci-
14. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Litigating Together: Social, Moral, and Legal Obligations,
B.U. L. REV. 87, 89 (2011).
15. JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALY-
SIS (1975); see also Allan Lind, John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, A Cross-Cultural Comparison
of the Effect of Adversary and Inquisitorial Processes on Bias in Legal Decisionmaking, 62 VA. L.
REV. 271 (1976); John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66 CAL. L. REV. 541
(1978).
16. THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 15, at 67–116.
17. Id.
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sions about whether to pursue grievances.18  The literature on
claiming is generally predicated on the economic premise that deci-
sions to pursue claims depend on the expected costs and benefits asso-
ciated with doing so.19  Similarly, early discussions of aggregation
focused on the impact of mass aggregation on the outcomes that peo-
ple receive.  In both cases, the underlying assumption is that issues of
efficiency, delay, costs, and settlement gains are the key factors of con-
cern to the public when pursuing litigation.
Recent studies have suggested that the cost–benefit approach does
not capture many of the issues that are important to litigants.  Con-
sider first the work of Relis on why plaintiffs sue, and what they seek
from litigation.20  Relis considers empirical evidence on the motiva-
tions and objectives of plaintiffs in the context of medical malpractice
claims.21  Her results suggest that plaintiffs seek (1) acknowledgement
of harm; (2) retribution for inappropriate or illegal conduct; (3) ad-
mission of fault; (4) truth concerning the events that occurred; and (5)
apologies.22  In other words, people sue for principled reasons related
to their dignity and desire for respect, their desire to be heard, and
their desire for accountability.23  In contrast, Relis argues that lawyers
believe (incorrectly) that people sue to gain monetary damages.24
Hadfield considered the same question in a study of individuals who
were injured or lost a family member in the September 11, 2001 ter-
rorist attacks.25  Those studied were involved in choosing whether or
not to accept a cash payment from the Victim Compensation Fund or
to pursue litigation.26  As in the prior study, those involved thought
that much more was involved in their choice than a monetary deci-
sion.  In particular, they were interested in obtaining information
about what happened, promoting accountability for those involved,
18. See, e.g., William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes:
Naming, Blaming, Claiming . . ., 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631 (1981).
19. See, e.g., George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1984).
20. See, e.g., Tamara Relis, Consequences of Power, 12 HARV. NEG. L. REV. 445 (2007);
Tamara Relis, “It’s Not About the Money!”: A Theory on Misconceptions of Plaintiffs’ Litigation
Aims, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 701 (2007) [hereinafter Relis, Not About the Money].
21. Relis, Not About the Money, supra note 20.
22. Id. at 721–28.
23. See id.
24. Id. at 735–36.
25. Gillian K. Hadfield, Framing the Choice Between Cash and the Courthouse: Experiences
with the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund, 42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 645 (2008).
26. Id. at 651–53.
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and participating in a process of producing change to prevent a repeti-
tion of the attack.27
Lind, Greenberg, Scott, and Welchans interviewed recently fired or
laid-off workers to understand why they did or did not initiate wrong-
ful termination claims.28  They found that two factors shaped employ-
ees estimates of the likelihood of suing: estimates of the likelihood of
winning, and how fairly the employee felt that they were treated on
the job and during the termination.  Of these factors, the most impor-
tant was the fairness of treatment at termination.29  The authors note
that “feelings of unfair, insensitive treatment at termination had
nearly twice the effect of the next most potent factor in determining
who would consider suing and who would not.”30  Factors shaping
fairness judgments included whether the employee received an honest
explanation for the policies that led them to be fired and whether they
felt that they were treated with dignity during the termination
process.31
Lind, Kulik, Ambrose, and DeVera Park studied how evaluations of
the fairness of court-ordered arbitration sessions shaped whether dis-
putants rejected those decisions and moved forward to a trial.32  This
study involved interviews with both corporate and individual litigants
in federal tort and contract actions.33  The study found that both the
objective outcome and evaluations of the procedural fairness of the
court-annexed arbitration hearing shaped decisions about whether to
accept the arbitration award.34  Of the two factors, procedural fairness
was the most important.35
Barclay considered the issue of when people accept a judicial deci-
sion instead of appealing.36  He did so by drawing from a sample of
1,103 civil litigants who had lost their cases and of whom 622 ap-
pealed.37  Based on interviews with a sample of these litigants, his
findings support a process-based model rather than an outcome-
27. Id. at 673.
28. E. Allan Lind et al., The Winding Road from Employee to Complainant: Situational and
Psychological Determinants of Wrongful Termination Claims, 45 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 557 (2000).
29. Id. at 580–81.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 581–82.
32. E. Allan Lind et al., Individual and Corporate Dispute Resolution: Using Procedural Fair-
ness as a Decision Heuristic, 38 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 224 (1993).
33. Id. at 231, 238.
34. Id. at 244.
35. See id. at 244–45.
36. SCOTT BARCLAY, AN APPEALING ACT: WHY PEOPLE APPEAL IN CIVIL CASES (1999).
37. Id. at 24.
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driven one.38  The primary motivation he identified was the desire to
be treated fairly in resolving claims.39  Such fair treatment is found to
involve having been heard by the courts.40  Those litigants who felt
that they were not heard in their trial, but who felt that they would be
heard by an appeals court, were the most likely to appeal.41
What are people seeking in appeals?  Barclay argues,
The very act of litigating carries meaning in itself for the litigant,
and it appears to work in several ways.  First, it validates the origi-
nal complaint of the litigant by having its value confirmed by the
fact that the court takes it seriously.  Simultaneously, the fact that
the court takes the litigant’s ideas seriously in considering a result is
taken as evidence that the litigant has effectively exposed the
wrongdoing of the other party in a public arena.  Thus, it is the very
nature of the court’s process that is important in meeting the liti-
gants’ goals.  Further, it is only in the court where such goals can be
met.42
And in the case of appeals, he suggests that litigants want their “com-
plaint about the existing policy” to be “given credence by the appel-
late court” by listening to their arguments.43
This research on litigation emphasizes the centrality of feeling that
one’s case has been treated fairly to the willingness to accept judicial
decisions and abide by them over time.  People are more willing to
accept court decisions if they believe court procedures are fair,44 and
they are also more willing to cooperate with the courts—for example,
by testifying or serving on a jury—if they believe that the courts func-
tion through fair procedures.45  Of particular importance is the finding
that procedural justice promotes decision adherence that lasts over
time.46  The procedural justice that a person experiences during their
time in a court also shapes their broader views about the legitimacy of
38. Id. at 155.
39. Id. at 84.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 121–22.
42. BARCLAY, supra note 36, at 119.
43. Id. at 124.
44. See, e.g., ROBERT J. MACCOUN ET AL., RAND CORP., ALTERNATIVE ADJUDICATION: AN
EVALUATION OF THE NEW JERSEY AUTOMOBILE ARBITRATION PROGRAM (1988); TOM R.
TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH THE
POLICE AND COURTS (2002); Lind et al., supra note 32.
45. Tyler & Jackson, supra note 4, at 79–80.
46. See, e.g., PENELOPE EILEEN BRYAN, CONSTRUCTIVE DIVORCE: PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
AND SOCIOLEGAL REFORM 12–14 (2006); Robert E. Emery et al., Child Custody Mediation and
Litigation: Parents’ Satisfaction and Functioning One Year After Settlement, 62 J. CONSULTING &
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 124 (1994); Tom R. Tyler et al., Reintegrative Shaming, Procedural Justice,
and Recidivism: The Engagement of Offenders’ Psychological Mechanisms in the Canberra RISE
Drinking-and-Driving Experiment, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 553 (2007).
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the court system.47  By giving people a way to engage the legal system,
aggregation creates an opportunity within which these objectives can
be obtained.
III. AGGREGATE LITIGATION AND VOICE
The problem associated with having a legal system based on this
model is that there are situations in which, regardless of what people
might want to do concerning a grievance, it is not financially practical
for them to pay the costs associated with individual litigation.  This
can be the case when the people who are injured lack the resources to
pay a lawyer, or have a case whose outcome is of sufficient uncertainty
that lawyers will not accept contingent fee arrangements.  In such a
setting, the strength of our system—i.e., the fact that litigants own
their own grievances—becomes a limiting condition.  This limitation
has become very apparent in situations of mass injury, where many
people suffer similar injuries emanating from a similar source that
they may not be able to seek justice for under traditional models of
litigation.
These problems can arise for a variety of reasons.  Some common
reasons are that litigants lack the resources to support the costs of
traditional litigation.  And, as individuals, they are not able to offer
attorneys the type of potential financial gain that would lead lawyers
to be willing to take their cases on a contingency-fee basis.  Such situa-
tions are widespread, and people often opt to “lump it” when they
suffer an injury.  However, when an injury is widespread or when
there is a sense that the offender behaved unethically, the failure to
have a hearing can be damaging to the courts, the law, and the
government.
47. See, e.g., THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 14; TYLER & HUO, supra note 44; TOM R.
TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2006); JO-ANNE M. WEMMERS, VICTIMS IN THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM (1996); RASHIDA ABUWALA & DONALD J. FAROLE, JR., THE EFFECTS OF THE
HARLEM HOUSING COURT ON TENANT PERCEPTIONS OF JUSTICE (2008), available at http://www
.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/Harlem_Housing_Court_Study.pdf; Ben Bradford, Voice,
Neutrality and Respect: Use of Victim Support Services, Procedural Fairness and Confidence in
the Criminal Justice System, 11 CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 345 (2011); DONALD J. FAROLE,
THE NEW YORK STATE RESIDENTS SURVEY: PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF NEW YORK’S COURTS
(2007), available at http://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/documents/NYS_Residents
_Survey.pdf; STEPHEN SHUTE ET AL., A FAIR HEARING?: ETHNIC MINORITIES IN THE CRIMINAL
COURTS (2013); Avishalom Tor et al., Fairness and the Willingness To Accept Plea Bargain Of-
fers, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 97, 113–14 (2010); Tom R. Tyler, Public Trust and Confidence
in Legal Authorities: What Do Majority and Minority Group Members Want from the Law and
Legal Institutions?, 19 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 215 (2001); Tom R. Tyler et al., Maintaining Allegiance
Toward Political Authorities: The Role of Prior Attitudes and the Use of Fair Procedures, 33 AM.
J. POL. SCI. 629 (1989).
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How are people affected by being in this situation?  Rottman and
Tyler analyzed the results of a survey of residents of California con-
ducted by the Administrative Office of the California Courts.48  That
survey examined whether people had ever considered taking a griev-
ance to court but had not done so; 25% of those interviewed were in
this group.49  The primary reason given for not going to court was a
lack of resources.50  They found that believing that one had been de-
nied the opportunity to go to court was associated with significantly
more negative views about the legitimacy of the courts.51
Of course, on an everyday basis, many legal claims are never pur-
sued for these and other reasons.  However, when many people suffer
from a similar cause, two important additional factors become in-
volved.  The first is the scope of the discontent and overall sense of
injustice that can be created by failing to address injustice.  The sec-
ond is the possibility that by acting together, people with an injury can
bring their cases into court even if they could not do so individually.
A key benefit of aggregation is that it allows people who otherwise
could not do so to bring their cases into courts where those cases can
receive a hearing.  This allows people seeking justice to pursue their
grievances and provides an opportunity for voice and adjudication of
their claims.  As Judge Weinstein says: “Every person has a sense of
justice. Every person wants to be treated fairly.  In this country fair
treatment usually includes the right to be heard in court by a judge
and usually a jury.”52  Hence, allowing cases into the system in aggre-
gate when individual pursuit of grievances is difficult promotes the
judgment that the courts provide fair procedures for the redress of
grievances both among the parties and in society more generally.
Such fairness judgments in turn encourage positive views about court
legitimacy.53
The importance of building legitimacy is a theme that is increasingly
articulated by legal authorities in an era of widespread distrust in our
major social and political institutions.  One focus of distrust is political
authority, including the executive (51% a great deal or a fair amount),
legislative (34% a great deal or a fair amount), and judicial (62% a
48. David B. Rottman & Tom R. Tyler, Thinking About Judges and Judicial Performance: The
Perspective of the Public, 4 ON˜ATI SOCIO-LEGAL SERIES 1046, 1051 (2014), available at http://ssrn
.com/abstract=2541450.
49. Id. at 1055.
50. See id.
51. See id. at 1054, 1064.
52. WEINSTEIN, supra note 11, at 1 (1995).
53. Tyler & Sevier, supra note 5, at 1127–30.
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great deal or a fair amount) branches of government.54 The judiciary
fares reasonably well in contrast to the other branches of government.
The proportion of Americans expressing a similar level of trust in the
judiciary was 75% in 2003.55  However, even the courts have lost legit-
imacy in recent years.
Hence, one important gain that is achieved by aggregation of cases
is that it allows people who have a grievance to have an opportunity
for their claims to be addressed within a legal forum.  This increases
their belief that their grievance has been handled fairly, promoting
acceptance of the resolution and promoting court legitimacy.  Mass
torts are especially relevant to the issue of court legitimacy by virtue
of the large number of people that are involved.  In cases such as the
Agent Orange case, if the large number of veterans involved can find
no way to seek redress for their claims, widespread distrust in the
courts and government is created.
The potential pitfall of aggregate litigation is the reverse of that
which has already been outlined: the loss of control and, in particular,
of voice.  In aggregate litigation, the link between lawyers and the
concerns of particular clients is diluted.  A lawyer represents many
clients, and those clients may or may not feel that they have voice.
There is no literature on voice and aggregation.  However, studies of
pro se litigation suggest that people do not feel that they lose voice
when they are represented by a lawyer as opposed to representing
themselves.56  Research is necessary to better understand the balance
of increased voice through involvement in litigation and potential de-
creased voice through sharing control.57
The first reason to support aggregation is that it may enable more
litigants to voice their grievances in forums where they can receive
principled decisions from legal authorities.  In the case of Agent Or-
ange, for example, we can ask what would have happened if the veter-
ans involved had had no forum to express their grievances.  This
would have encouraged anger and distrust, and undermined both the
courts and the government.  Hence, opening up the courts in an era in
which access to the courts is diminishing is desirable.  Aggregation
helps to achieve that goal.
54. Trust in Government, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/5392/trust-government.aspx
(last visited Jan. 19, 2015) (reporting the results of a survey conducted Sept. 5–8, 2013).
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., Nourit Zimerman & Tom R. Tyler, Between Access to Counsel and Access to
Justice: A Psychological Perspective, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 473 (2010).
57. See generally Stephan Landsman, Pro Se Litigation, 8 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 231
(2012).
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IV. A RELATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON LITIGATION
Findings about procedural justice in litigation indicate that issues of
voice and neutrality in decision making are important, but they also
suggest a need to broaden the framework for discussions of procedu-
ral fairness.58  This broadening moves our conception of treatment be-
yond the handling of one’s complaint to the issue of quality of
interpersonal treatment, i.e., how a person feels handled as a member
of the community.
A focus on voice and neutrality accords with the traditional legal
framing of procedural design as being about how legal authorities
structure trials and deliberation about cases.  A fair judge is one who
correctly applies the law to the facts in a particular case, usually with
the goal of achieving the correct outcome.  However, this framing of
procedural justice is inadequate to deal with the broader set of con-
cerns that emerge from studies of litigants.
Research on the popular meaning of procedural justice suggests
that the public also considers issues related to the quality of their
treatment by judicial authorities.59  People first value treatment with
respect.60  They want to have their status as human beings and mem-
bers of the political community acknowledged by judicial and political
authorities.61  Because quality of treatment is a statement about their
status, people are sensitive to whether they are treated with dignity
and politeness, and to whether their rights as members of the commu-
nity are respected.62  This issue of respectful interpersonal treatment
consistently emerges as a key factor in reactions to dealings with legal
authorities.63  People believe that they are entitled to be treated with
respect, and they react very negatively to dismissive or demeaning in-
terpersonal treatment.64
People also focus on cues that communicate information about the
intentions and character of the legal authorities with whom they are
dealing.65  This involves inferences of integrity, trustworthiness, and
good faith.66  People react favorably to the judgment that the authori-
ties with whom they are interacting are benevolent, caring, and sin-
58. See generally Thibaut & Walker, supra note 14.
59. See Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, A Relational Model of Authority in Groups, 25 AD-
VANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 115, 160–65 (1992).
60. Id. at 161.
61. Id. at 158–60.
62. Id. at 160–62.
63. Id. at 165–66.
64. Id. at 164–65.
65. See TYLER & HUO, supra note 44.
66. Id. at 61–64.
2015] THE PSYCHOLOGY OF AGGREGATION 723
cerely trying to listen to and understand the needs and concerns of the
parties so that they can do what is best for the people with whom they
are dealing.67  Authorities communicate this type of concern when
they are seen to listen to people’s accounts and then explain or justify
their actions in ways that show an awareness of and sensitivity to what
people have said.68  In discussions about whether or not to accept a
directive from a legal authority, each of these concerns is typically as
or more important in decisions than are assessments of the fairness or
favorability of the decision itself.69
Litigants are more likely to indicate that they received fair decision
making than they are to indicate that they experienced fair treatment.
Yet, fair treatment is more strongly related to acceptance of decisions
and trust in the courts.  Hence, attention to issues of respect for a
litigant’s claims and establishment of a forum in which they have au-
thorities that they trust are areas of the courts that are relatively
underdeveloped.
It is here that Judge Weinstein’s insights about how to manage ag-
gregate litigation are particularly important.  Initial discussions of ag-
gregation focused on the suggestion that aggregation provides a
mechanism for quicker and possibly fairer settlements.  As an exam-
ple, using a few trials of cases selected statistically to establish liability
and damages, and then a formula to dispense damage awards to a
large group of plaintiffs, improves the speed with which people re-
ceive damage awards.70  While such an approach is potentially effi-
cient, focusing on such approaches raises questions about whether
damages are the central issue propelling litigation.
Certainly, in some types of cases, damages are a key issue.  Work-
place compensation programs are an example of a system designed to
address injuries in cases in which responsibility is recognized and
there are generally not issues of negligence or wrongdoing.71  How-
ever, many of the aggregate litigation cases that have had high levels
of visibility in recent years have involved important questions of po-
67. See id.
68. See id. at 65–67.
69. Id.
70. See, e.g., Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 782–86 (9th Cir. 1996); Laurens Walker
& John Monahan, Sampling Damages, 83 IOWA L. REV. 545 (1998).
71. See DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., RAND CORP., COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJU-
RIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1991), available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/re
ports/2006/R3999.pdf.
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tential negligence or wrongdoing,72 and the research already outlined
suggests that in such situations compensation is not the only or even
the central issue to the people pursuing grievances.
Judge Weinstein articulates a broader view of the issue of what peo-
ple want that foreshadows the findings of empirical research on what
litigants mean by a fair procedure for managing their grievances and
injuries.73  He suggests that “[s]teps should be taken to ensure that
courts provide individual justice, even in a mass context.”74  More
broadly he asks:
How can we provide each plaintiff and each defendant with the ben-
efits of a system in mass torts that treats him or her as an individual
person?  How can each person obtain the respect that his or her
own individuality and personal needs should command in an egali-
tarian democracy such as ours?75
Studies support the suggestion that the public cares about the con-
cerns raised by Judge Weinstein.  One model that organizes these con-
cerns is the relational model of authority, a model based on the
findings of procedural justice.76  Studies indicate that when people are
reacting to their experiences with legal authorities, they are centrally
influenced by the quality of their treatment.77  The key point is that
public evaluations of judicial authorities and institutions center most
heavily around issues of quality of treatment rather than on evalua-
tions of the quality of the decision making of the courts.78
To illustrate this point, we can consider research on how the public
deals with disliked groups.  A perennial issue in law is determining
what obligations society owes to minority groups that want to express
unpopular ideas through teaching, public demonstrations, or in other
ways.  One study presents members of the public with such groups and
asks about several types of denials that might occur.79  The public re-
gards the most acceptable form of denial as the refusal to provide re-
sources to allow the group to promote its agency.80  An intermediately
acceptable denial is to deny the group procedural rights, such as the
72. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler & Hulda Thorisdottir, A Psychological Perspective on Compensa-
tion for Harm: Examining the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REV.
355 (2003).
73. WEINSTEIN, supra note 11.
74. Id. at 2–3.
75. Id. at 3.
76. Tyler & Lind, supra note 59.
77. See, e.g., Tyler & Sevier, supra note 5, at 1106.
78. Id. at 1129–30.
79. Huo, Yuen J., Justice and the Regulation of Social Relations: When and Why Do Group
Members Deny Claims to Social Goods, 41 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 535 (2002).
80. Id. at 554–58.
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right to speak or assemble.81  However, the least acceptable form of
denial would be to treat members of the group disrespectfully.82  In
other words, of all the forms of injustice, disrespect is viewed as the
most serious.
Fair procedures are important because they provide reassurance
that those in positions of legal authority are attending to these rela-
tional issues.  As a consequence, when people deal with an authority,
or are the members of a group, organization, community, or society,
and see evidence that fair procedures are shaping decisions, rules, and
policies, they are then more willing to merge their sense of self with
the group, intertwining their identities with the values of the group.
As people identify more closely with others and the institutions and
authorities that unite them, they both view them as more legitimate
and engage in a variety of group-supporting behaviors, including fol-
lowing rules, accepting decisions, cooperating with authorities, and
generally taking actions that people perceive will help their group.83
A relational view of the courts supports a broader conception of
what fairness looks like.  It supports efforts to humanize judges by
allowing them opportunities to communicate respect to members of
the public and to highlight their sincere and principled (e.g., “trust-
worthy”) behavior.  Such efforts touch on the two core elements of
public conceptions of fairness noted, and thus are central to legitimat-
ing the court to the American public.
Judge Weinstein understood these concerns of the American public,
and hence had a good sense of how to create and maintain legitimacy
for the court and its decisions.  Studies of public reactions to both lo-
cal courts and the Supreme Court all demonstrate that when people
talk about having experienced a fair or an unfair procedure, they
make that determination by considering both the fairness of decision
making and the fairness of treatment.  These same studies further sug-
gest that fairness of treatment is of particular importance.
Tyler and Sevier used information collected from a national sample
of Americans to examine the legitimacy of local courts.84  They ex-
amined the degree to which court legitimacy was based on the quality
of the decision making of the courts as defined as the frequency with
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See generally TOM R. TYLER & STEVEN L. BLADER, COOPERATION IN GROUPS: PROCEDU-
RAL JUSTICE, SOCIAL IDENTITY, AND BEHAVIORAL ENGAGEMENT (2000); Tom R. Tyler &
Steven L. Blader, The Group Engagement Model: Procedural Justice, Social Identity & Coopera-
tive Behavior, 7 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 349 (2003).
84. Tyler & Sevier, supra note 5.
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which the courts were believed to make accurate decisions and to allo-
cate resources or punish appropriately.85  While the results indicate
that legitimacy is, to some extent, based on the evaluation of the qual-
ity of decision making of the courts, the primary factor shaping legiti-
macy is the perceived quality of the treatment people received from
judicial authorities.86  This includes whether people believe that they
are respected when they deal with the courts, and whether they think
that judges care about and consider people’s needs and concerns when
making decisions.87  The study also shows that people are more willing
to cooperate with the courts as institutions when they view them as
legitimate.88  This includes a greater willingness to bring disputes to
court instead of engaging in private violence, and more willingness to
be a witness in a court proceeding.89
Recent efforts to understand public views about the Supreme Court
have identified a similar set of issues shaping public views about the
Court and an image of public support that includes relational con-
cerns.  Gibson interviewed a randomly chosen sample of Americans
and found that legitimacy was linked to issues of principle and sincer-
ity.90  In terms of principle, judges are viewed as acting out of a sin-
cere effort to decide based on principle, rather than in a strategic
effort to advance their own self-interest, as members of Congress are
viewed.91
Kahan argues that the challenge for the Court is to transcend the
tendency of people to view the Court through the lens of their prior
perceptions of policy-relevant facts (motivated reasoning).92  Kahan
notes that “citizens of diverse values are prone to forming opposing
perceptions of the Supreme Court’s neutrality.”93  Kahan’s insight is
interesting because he suggests that the key to gaining acceptance
does not lie only in a greater effort by the Court to explain how it
makes decisions.94  He suggests that the Court may be required to
“say much more than is required strictly to decide a case.”95  To touch
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1128–30.
87. Id. at 1128.
88. Id. at 1114–15.
89. Id. at 1123.
90. James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Has Legal Realism Damaged the Legitimacy of
the U.S. Supreme Court?, 45 L. & SOC’Y REV. 195, 213–14 (2011).
91. Id. at 200.
92. Dan M. Kahan, Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitu-
tional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2011).
93. Id. at 58.
94. See id. at 53–59.
95. Id. at 71.
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public concerns, courts need to address the broader range of issues
outlined in the prior discussion about public views concerning
fairness.
Kahan argues that instead of simply elaborating its reasoning to
promote confidence in its impartiality, the Court should consider so-
cial psychological strategies for countering motivated reasoning.96
One principle is “aporia,” the acknowledgement of the complexity of
the issues involved in a case.  This acknowledgement, as Kahan out-
lines, reflects a willingness on the part of the Justices to be inclusive by
acknowledging the arguments made by all the sides to an issue.97  This
shows everyone involved that the Court is giving fair and open-
minded consideration to opposing arguments.98
Kahan’s second principle is affirmation.99  Here, he reflects the idea
of respect for people, their rights, and their standing in society.100  He
argues that the Court should explicitly affirm people’s possession of
valued traits and characteristics by communicating respect for the sta-
tus and values of the groups with which they identify.101  This should
be done for all the different parties involved in a case.102  Such recog-
nition of people and the groups that shape their identity promotes not
only Court legitimacy, but identification with society and government.
Tyler and Krochik further explored the psychology of support for
the Court or Congress in the context of ideological conflicts.103  They
used a vignette procedure in which those who completed a question-
naire were first told that the Court had made a decision consistent
with or opposed to their own views on a controversial economic or
social issue.104  Their findings suggest that judgments about the fair-
ness of procedures do shape the willingness to accept Court decisions
above and beyond whether those decisions reflected the person’s own
social or economic values.105  Overall, three factors mattered.  The
first was whether or not people assessed that the Court or Congress
made decisions fairly (principled decision making).106  The second was
whether people felt that the Court or Congress considered public con-
96. Id. at 62–64.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 63.
99. Kahan, supra note 92, at 67.
100. See id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 67–68.
103. Tom Tyler & Margarita Krochik, Deference to Authority as a Basis for Managing Ideolog-
ical Conflict, 88 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 433, 436–39 (2013).
104. Id. at 442.
105. Id. at 444–47.
106. Id. at app. 452.
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cerns when making decisions.107  And, the third was whether people
felt that the Court or Congress respected public values.108  Of these
three issues, the one most central to accepting Court decisions was
whether the Court was seen as considering public concerns.109
What implications do these findings have for courts?  First, they
suggest the wisdom and value of the efforts that Judge Weinstein has
already undertaken to strengthen the connection between courts and
the public.  And, research findings support his intuition that this effort
needs to be broader than focusing on the neutrality and factuality of
judicial decision making, individual or aggregate.  Those are impor-
tant elements of the public’s view of the courts, but research findings
point to issues of trust in the motives of judges and in their willingness
to recognize and acknowledge public concerns.  Hence, these are ob-
vious points of contact with the public.
Why does this matter?  Because the findings concerning what peo-
ple want point to issues that ought to be central to efforts to resolve
any litigation, and in particular to designing ways to manage aggregate
litigation.  The risk in such litigation is that the needs and concerns of
the individual parties get lost and that, as a consequence, the people
involved do not feel fairly treated and do not view the courts as legiti-
mate.  A key implication is that mass settlements should not replace
individual hearings.  Judge Weinstein led the way with Agent Orange
by holding hearings during which victims could address him and talk
about their cases.
Kenneth Feinberg has developed this idea in his subsequent efforts,
including administrating the 9/11 Compensation Fund.110  His ap-
proach has been to tailor awards to individuals only after they have
the opportunity for a personalized, customized hearing.111  In fact, he
suggests that having such hearings was “the essential reason that the
program was so successful.”112  He argues that people felt that “he
was empathetic, [he] appreciated the arguments, [he] didn’t cut [them]
off, [they] had a chance to vent [their] emotion, and [they] think [they]
were treated with respect.”113  And, consistent with the perspective
being outlined, he notes that people did not come to argue about
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Tyler & Krochik, supra note 103, at app. 452.
110. Kenneth R. Feinberg, Keynote Address, How Can ADR Alleviate Long-Standing Social
Problems?, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 785 (2007).
111. Id. at 789.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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money.114  They came to speak about other issues.  To summarize, he
argues that he is “now a big believer in due process hearings in admin-
istrative proceedings.”115
What is crucial about these comments is that the hearings were not
directed at a discussion of the legal rules used to determine the settle-
ments.  They were about the relational issues outlined.  Hearings pro-
vide injured parties with an opportunity to express their feelings, state
their arguments, present their evidence, describe their losses, and talk
about their grievances before authorities who recognize their standing
to address the court and to have themselves, their needs, and their
concerns acknowledged and taken seriously.  And, the advantage of
mass litigation is that it provides a forum for achieving these goals that
otherwise would most likely be unavailable because people would be
unable to come before the court for financial or pragmatic reasons,
leaving large numbers of people feeling that they had not received
their day in court and, consequently, lowering the legitimacy of the
courts and the government.
Conversely, this perspective on aggregate litigation points to a po-
tential pitfall of aggregation.  If aggregation removes the opportunity
for people to receive individualized attention to their problems, it will
potentially be less satisfactory and will undermine, rather than build,
legitimacy.  To the degree that aggregate litigation removes people
with injuries from forums in which they can receive their day in court
and substitutes formulas for dispensing compensation, those with
grievances are less likely to feel fairly treated.
V. AGGREGATE LITIGATION AND COMMUNITY SOLIDARITY
Judge Weinstein’s treatment of aggregation reflects a broader con-
ception of why people pursue grievances than one framed around is-
sues such as winning or losing and the amount and nature of
compensation received.  It also contains a broader view of the mean-
ing of procedural justice than that found in early psychological re-
search.  Hence, it defines a view of what people want that is more
inclusive, and more consistent with the psychological research out-
lined here.  However, in another respect, Judge Weinstein’s framing of
aggregate litigation is very traditional.  His focus is on the relationship
between individual litigants and a legal authority—in his case, the
judge.  His concerns are still shaped around the idea of having a
judge-controlled system respond to individuals.  And, within this
114. Id. at 791.
115. Id.
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framework, the judge controls decisions about forming and certifying
a legal class and framing how aggregate litigation will go forward.
More recently, the courts have become less open to aggregate litiga-
tion.  From the framework of people with injuries, this development
limits the possibility of achieving the gains of voice that have already
been outlined.  As Burch suggests,
Instead of taking the realities of mass torts into account, courts as-
sume that adversarial legalism and conventional norms . . . continue
to ensure procedural justice.  They do not.  Procedures designed for
bipolar “plaintiff versus defendant” litigation cannot handle the de-
mise of adversarial litigation, the volume of claims and litigants, the
attenuated attorney-client relationships, and the resulting agency
problems presented by mass torts.  And yet, because institutional
legitimacy and voluntary compliance with judicial decisions hinge
on procedural justice, retrofitting the judicial infrastructure is
crucial.116
So, how can the psychological gains outlined above be achieved in this
new, less friendly era?
Recent legal scholarship has pointed to an additional type of aggre-
gate litigation that remains possible.117  That is private aggregation
through contracts among plaintiffs or between a group of plaintiffs
and lawyers.  Unlike prior forms of aggregation, this form is not deter-
mined by judicial authorities.  Instead, it is a private agreement among
a group of people who feel that they are similarly injured and who
identify a common cause of those injuries.  The primary proponent of
this perspective is Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, who draws on both
moral and political philosophy and social psychology to support her
arguments.118  I will focus on this development from the perspective of
the psychology of aggregation.
The fundamental point Burch makes is that although the traditional
system treats individuals and their cases separately, the common na-
ture of both the injury and the defendant in mass cases invites litigants
to identify and act as a group.119  This promotes trust, reciprocity, and
altruism within the group, leads to cooperative behavior, and encour-
ages people to think about the issues involved on a group, rather than
an individual, level.120
116. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Procedural Justice in Nonclass Aggregation, 44 WAKE FOR-
EST L. REV. 1, 2 (2009).
117. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Litigating Groups, 61 ALA. L. REV. 1 (2009) [here-
inafter Burch, Litigating Groups]; Burch, supra note 14; Burch, surpa note 116.
118. See articles cited supra note 116.
119. Burch, supra note 14, at 90–93.
120. Id.
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The advantage is that engaging in aggregate litigation promotes the
same types of psychological benefits that have already been associated
with procedural fairness.  Despite these potential advantages, “few, if
any, attempts have been made to harness the power of groups for the
good of the litigants.”121
While people can bring their grievances to court, the psychological
aspects of their interaction with court authorities can also be ad-
dressed by solidarity among groups of litigants.  They can provide
each other with acknowledgement and emotional support.  And, as
groups develop, the people within them increasingly act not out of
self-interest, but out of concern for the well-being of the group.  Peo-
ple identify with the collectivity and work jointly to achieve its aims.
In addition to addressing people’s concerns for respect and acknowl-
edgement, groups are resilient and proactive in pursuing objectives in
the face of external difficulties.
To achieve the psychological gains noted, it is important to mini-
mize the role of lawyers in self-organized groups.  How can this be
achieved?  Many court systems, including California’s, provide poten-
tial litigants with advice and guidance in the form of websites and help
centers.  Such guidance could easily include information about how to
join together to pursue litigation.  Further, rules should encourage
opt-in provisions so that people’s sense of choice and commitment to
the group is maximized.  Perceived choice builds solidarity.
VI. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF COLLECTIVE ACTION
Grievances can be conceptualized at the individual level, at the
group level, or at the society or system level.122  Individual justice re-
fers to what a particular person receives in response to some grievance
or injury, as in, “my compensation for my workplace injury was less
than I deserved,” or “the settlement gave me too little money.”
Group-based justice claims are framed in terms of group membership,
for example, “African-Americans are unfairly treated,” or “gay peo-
ple deserve more rights.”  Finally, societal judgments speak to the
overall distribution of resources or opportunities in society.  We might
say, for example, that it is “unfair” that one percent of our society’s
population controls such a large share of our total wealth.  As has
been noted, the legal system traditionally focuses on individual griev-
ances handled individually, and aggregate litigation is a move toward
collective case management, based on the idea that, in some way, the
121. Burch, Litigating Groups, supra note 117, at 2.
122. See Tom R. Tyler, Justice and Effective Cooperation, 25 SOC. JUST. RES. 355 (2012).
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people involved are a group by virtue of common experiences.  Still,
while individuals may form a group, they still receive individualized
justice.
A central distinction made in the social psychological literature is
between deprivations that people understand to have occurred at the
individual level (e.g., “I get less than I should”) and the group level
(e.g., “my group gets less than it should”).123  This framing issue is
important because it shapes whether people respond to injustice as
individuals or as a group.124  In particular, the group-level framing of
injustice may lead to people taking group-based or collective action,
which has been defined as acts in which people serve as representa-
tives of a group to which they belong when the action is directed at
improving the conditions of the group as a whole.125
Framing problems as due to group characteristics encourages peo-
ple to work as a group to respond to those problems.  In his seminal
work Why Men Rebel,126 Gurr contends that feelings of shared eco-
nomic deprivation, for example, are at the roots of political action, as
people collectively voice their discontent with the discrepancy be-
tween their group’s expected and actual material conditions.127
The key point for the legal system is that when people define them-
selves as members of a group, they are more likely to respond to col-
lective injustice by taking organized, group-based action.  This has the
potential for allowing individuals to take on themselves the control of
their cases on the basis of group actions, something that has happened
in the past, but only because judges defined them as reflecting a class.
People can also define themselves as a group.  What determines
whether people do, in fact, define their grievances in collective terms
123. See CAROLINE KELLY & SARA BREINLINGER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF COLLECTIVE
ACTION:  IDENTITY, INJUSTICE AND GENDER 13–15 (1996); see also W. G. RUNCIMAN, RELATIVE
DEPRIVATION AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 9–35 (1966).
124. James M. Olson, Resentment About Deprivation: Entitlement and Hopefulness as
Mediators of the Effects of Qualifications, in 4 RELATIVE DEPRIVATION AND SOCIAL COMPARI-
SON 57, 73–76 (James M. Olson et al. eds., 1986); see also Stephen C. Wright et al., Responding to
Membership in a Disadvantaged Group: From Acceptance to Collective Protest, 58 J. PERSONAL-
ITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 994, 995 (1990).
125. Brenda Major, From Social Inequality to Personal Entitlement:  The Role of Social Com-
parsions, Legitimacy Appraisals, and Group Membership, 26 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 293 (1994); see also Jacquelien van Stekelenburg & Bert Klandermans, Individuals in
Movements: A Social Psychology of Contention, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS ACROSS
DISCIPLINES 157 (Bert Klandermans & Conny Roggeband eds., 2007) [hereinafter Stekelenburg
& Klandermans, Individuals in Movements]; Jacquelien van Stekelenburg & Bert Klandermans,
The Social Psychology of Protest, 61 CURRENT SOC. REV. 886 (2013) [hereinafter Stekelenburg
& Klandermans, Psychology of Protest]; Wright et al., supra note 124.
126. TED ROBERT GURR, WHY MEN REBEL (1970).
127. Id. at 12–14.
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and pursue collective action?  One factor is legitimacy.  If people feel
that the injuries they have suffered reflect moral wrongdoing by ille-
gitimate institutions or authorities, they are more likely to join to-
gether to seek accountability.128  People are also influenced by their
evaluations of their likelihood of success (collective efficacy).129
One important finding of studies on collective action echoes the
point made by Burch.  As people join together to form a group, group
interests begin to supplant individual interests and the potential devel-
ops for groups to act in ways that are more than simply aggregations
of individual claims.130  For this reason, the likelihood of groups acting
collectively to correct injustices is facilitated when the people in the
group identify with common group membership.131 The more people
identify with a group, the more likely it is that they will participate in
actions on behalf of the group, and the more likely it is that those
actions will be based on their group-linked identity needs, rather than
individual instrumental reasons.132  Being a valued member of the
group, respected by others, becomes the central reason for behavior.
It is important to recognize that deprivations need not be material.
People are also sensitive to procedural deprivations, as when people
feel that those in their group do not receive equal respect for their
rights.  Given the relative importance people are found to place on
procedures over outcomes, it has been suggested that grievances stem-
ming from perceived group level procedural injustice might be a more
powerful predictor of collective action than those stemming from dis-
tributive injustice.133  For example, it has been found that procedural-
justice judgments predict people’s support for union certification and
128. Major, supra note 125.
129. Stekelenburg & Klandermans, Individuals in Movements, supra note 125; see also
Stekelenburg & Klandermans, Psychology of Protest, supra note 125.
130. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE COOPERATE: THE ROLE OF SOCIAL MOTIVATIONS 101-
02 (2011).
131. Henri Tajfel & John Turner, An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict, in THE SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS 33, 40–41 (William G. Austin & Stephen Worchel
eds., 1979); see also TYLER, supra note 129, at 11–26.
132. Dominic Abrams, Processes of Social Identification, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF IDEN-
TITY AND THE SELF CONCEPT 57, 58–59 (Glynis M. Breakwell ed., 1992); see also Bert
Klandermans et al., Identity Processes in Collective Action Participation: Farmers’ Identity and
Farmers’ Protest in the Netherlands and Spain, 23 POL. PSYCHOL. 235, 237–39 (2002); Bernd
Simon & Bert Klandermans, Politicized Collective Identity: A Social Psychological Analysis, 56
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 319, 323 (2001).
133. Tom R. Tyler & Heather J. Smith, Social Justice and Social Movements, in 2 THE HAND-
BOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 595, 610 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998).
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the votes they cast in a union certification election, even after ac-
counting for the influence of their economic concerns.134
Framing grievances at a collective level, in other words, leads to
joining together to pursue grievances.  As people do so, they become
intertwined with groups, and individual gains and losses become less
central to shaping motivation.  This explains why groups seeking so-
cial change persist over time in the face of defeats and evidence that
their success is unlikely.135  Outside observers are often struck by the
willingness of the members of groups seeking social change to perse-
vere in their actions when success seems unlikely or even impossible.
What sustains such action is the internal dynamics of the group and
the esteem and status that members derive from others working with
them toward a group goal.  Internal social dynamics replace monetary
issues as the motivation that is sustaining group actions.136
What leads to identification with a collective entity?  Studies, con-
ducted primarily in work organizations, suggest that when groups op-
erate using fair procedures, they generate identification among their
members.  This is widely found among hierarchical groups,137 but is
also a conclusion of studies of nonhierarchical groups, such as
teams.138  What is required for the members of a group to feel that
group procedures are fair?  First, people need to be involved in deter-
mining what the group will do.  They need to be able to deliberate and
make decisions about goals and priorities as a group.  They need to be
able to collectively determine their objectives and decision rules.  Sec-
ond, when interacting with one another, they need to act fairly by giv-
ing group members voice, acting transparently, treating one another
with dignity and respect, and being trusted by one another to behave
in ways that reflect a desire to do what is best for everyone in the
group.139
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What implications does this have for the legal system?  It suggests
that there is value in groups organizing and functioning in ways that
engage their members.  If the members delegate decisions to their
agents (i.e., their lawyers) and have minimal participation in decisions
about actions—individual or aggregate—then the potential benefits of
aggregate action are diminished.  What is important is the possibility
of aggregate action achieving more than can be achieved by people
acting as individuals.
This perspective on litigation accords with an emerging view of the
goals of the legal system.  In the past, a key issue in law was a focus on
compliance.  The system sought to create legal rules and make legal
decisions in ways that encouraged the public to comply with and defer
to the authority of legal actors.
In recent years, levels of trust in law have declined, and efforts have
been increasingly focused on gaining cooperation.  In the case of liti-
gants, the focus has been on willing acceptance because when people
do not accept decisions, further litigation is often required, either be-
cause they appeal or because they fail to continue to comply over
time.  There have been similar concerns about the public’s willingness
to cooperate with the courts by testifying and serving on a jury.  These
efforts have been focused on cooperation within the framework of the
legal system.  As cooperation becomes a more important goal of the
legal system, legitimacy increasingly matters, because legitimacy
strongly influences cooperation.
It has also been increasingly recognized that the law and legal au-
thorities play an important role in promoting or undermining the vi-
tality of communities.  They create a framework for social solidarity
and political, social, and economic well-being, a view already noted in
Justice Breyer’s comments.140  Hence, developing ways to build social
capital in the process of managing community social problems is desir-
able.  When groups of people join together to address collective
problems in their community, they are building the type of social capi-
tal that is central to viability, so collective efforts to define and pursue
grievances not only help to manage particular problems, but generally
build social cohesion within communities. This may be particularly im-
portant in situations in which society gains from addressing larger po-
litical or societal issues, such as how to manage compensation for the
respond individually, they lack this social support.  Heather J. Smith & Yuen J. Huo, Relative
Deprivation: How Subjective Experiences of Inequality Influence Social Behavior and Health, 1
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9/11 attacks or how to respond to the widespread damage of the Brit-
ish Petroleum oil spill.
It is equally important, however, to point to a potential pitfall of
this group-based approach.  Once groups are established, failing to re-
spond to their concerns can create social forces that transcend the le-
gal system and may also undermine the social and political framework
within which law exists.  In evaluating collective action, it is important
to make a distinction between normative (or conventional, nondisrup-
tive activities such as signing petitions, sending letters, and making
donations) and non-normative (or unconventional, more disruptive
activities such as occupying buildings and setting cars on fire) forms of
protest.  The antecedents of these forms of action are different.  High
legitimacy and high collective efficacy predict normative protest, while
lack of legitimacy and a belief in the low efficacy of conventional ac-
tions are predictors of non-normative protest.141
These later findings highlight the dilemma for the legal system.  In
order to maximize the gains of aggregate litigation in terms of legiti-
macy and identification with the community, it is important to maxi-
mize the role of the parties in the development of litigation strategy
and its implementation.  This encourages people to develop group sol-
idarity and address broader issues in their community.  In cases like
Agent Orange, in which the legal and the political are mixed, this is
potentially valuable.  However, it also means that groups develop
agendas that they might pursue beyond the confines of the courts.
Failure to address these issues can lead to pressure for political
change, and can even lead to actions outside of the law.
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